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Abstract
This paper studies the vulnerability of the pivotal mechanism with re-
spect to manipulation by groups. In a lab experiment, groups decide on
the implementation of various alternatives, some of which imply opposite
interests for the two subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and
explicit collusion by allowing for communication within subgroups in one
treatment and prohibiting it in another. Even though all agents' prefer-
ences are common knowledge and there exists a simple symmetric collusive
strategy for one subgroup, we nd little evidence for tacit collusion, not even
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collusion is established, and it becomes even more pronounced over time.
Keywords: Collective Decision Making, Pivotal Mechanism, Collusion
JEL Classication: D71, D61, C92
Corresponding author: anita.gantner@uibk.ac.at, Universit atsstr.15, A-6020 Innsbruck, Tel.:
+43/512/507/7377, Fax: +43/512/507/2980. We gratefully acknowledge nancial support by
the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through Project No. S10307-G14 and by the University of
Innsbruck though grant \Nachwuchsf orderung". Thanks to Karl Seiringer for excellent research
assistance.
11 Introduction
The pivotal mechanism (Clarke 1971) is a demand revealing mechanism developed
for public goods decisions which proposes an ecient solution to the question of
whether or not a public good of a given size should be provided. It uses a transfer
system such that each individual takes into account the marginal social impact on
the rest of society made by this individual's vote or report. In environments with
quasi-linear preferences revelation of true preferences is then a dominant strategy.1
The pivotal mechanism has a remarkable standing in the literature: It is one of
the most well-known mechanisms in social choice theory, present in each textbook
of public choice since decades. Despite being a nice theoretical construct, it has
experienced a less successful history with respect to its applications in the context
of public goods provision.
This paper reports the results of an experiment that studies how the lack of
coalition-proofness aects the performance of the pivotal mechanism. Already in
the 70s, Groves and Ledyard (1977a, 1977b) pointed out some shortcomings of
demand revealing mechanisms that may aect the desired ecient allocation in a
public goods context. Besides the failure to produce a budget balance they also
noted that the mechanisms are vulnerability to strategic manipulation by coalitions
of agents which would move the outcome away from Pareto optimality. Tideman
and Tullock (1977), on the other hand, considered this a characteristic of all group
processes including markets and majority rules, thus defending the applicability
of demand-revealing processes. Green and Laont (1979) later provided a formal
proof for the impossibility of nding coalition incentive compatible Groves mech-
anisms, even if only a single coalition with two or more agents can be formed.
Whether and when groups can successfully manipulate the pivotal mechanism
is an empirical question, which will be studied in this paper. The possibility of
manipulation is relevant in a situation which allows a (sub)group of decision makers
to coordinate their actions in order to obtain an outcome that is preferred by this
group. We shall also refer to such actions as collusive behavior. One setting in
which a collusive outcome may be expected is when communication amongst agents
is possible. But from a theoretical perspective, collusion may also occur tacitly in
the absence of explicit communication, in particular in a setting with rational
and selsh agents who have complete information about other agents' preferences.
Empirically, it is far from clear a priori whether and when collusion will actually
occur in a given setup. There are at least three immediate motives for which
1Groves (1973), as well as Groves and Loeb (1975), and much earlier Vickrey (1961) indepen-
dently also discovered such incentive compatible demand revealing mechanisms for environments
with separable utility functions. Green and Laont (1977) showed that the class of mecha-
nisms proposed by Groves includes all these mechanisms, and furthermore that any ecient and
strategy-proof direct revelation mechanism is isomorphic to a Groves mechanism.
2such behavior may not be observed: First, a misrepresentation of preferences that
leads to higher payos for a coalition requires that agents are able to identify such
manipulation possibilities, thus limitations in cognitive abilities may prevent agents
from collusive behavior. Second, agents may not be suciently condent about
collusive behavior of other agents, thus complete information about other agents'
preferences might not be sucient to predict the occurrence of collusion as long
as there is uncertainty about others' choices. And third, if one departs from the
assumption of purely self-interested agents, it is possible that social preferences
prevent agents from collusive behavior if the consequences are harsh for others.
Expressed dierently, the mechanism might work despite the theoretical prediction
of collusion.
Experimental methods seem to be a useful tool to identify properties of this
mechanism that are responsible for the diculties in application. So far, experi-
mental literature on the pivotal mechanism focussed on the (serious) problem that
people do not seem to choose dominant strategies, that is, truth-telling is actually
not implemented in the pivotal mechanism.2 It was always suspected that this
mechanism is too complex to be well-understood for applications and it therefore
may not fulll its intended purpose of revealing true preferences. This view was
supported by the study of Attiyeh, Franciosi and Isaac (2000), who found that
less than 10% of subjects revealed their true valuation for the public good, and
moreover, no tendency toward the dominant strategy prediction was observed over
time. The results suggested that due to its complexity the mechanism is inadequate
for applications in the demand for public goods.3 On the other hand, Kawagoe
and Mori (2001) showed that there is a remedy to subjects' confusion caused by
the complexity of the mechanism. When subjects were presented detailed payo
tables in addition to the abstract rule that maps bids to outcomes, nearly one half
of the subjects played the dominant strategy. Kawagoe and Mori further argue
that the bad performance of the pivotal mechanism in Attiyeh et el. (2000) may
be due to the lack of strict incentive compatibility, i.e., since there exists a large
number of strategies that leave subjects as well o as truth-telling for a wide range
of strategies chosen by others, it is dicult for subjects to see why truth-telling
is the unique dominant strategy. Finally, Cason et al. (2006) study the eect of
secure implementation, which refers to mechanisms that ensure dominant strategy
implementation with the additional requirement that there be no Nash equilibrium
outcome other than the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. This is not given
in the pivotal mechanism, as there exist multiple Nash equilibria, in particular
2One of the early experiments by Tideman (1983) already suggested this possibility. However,
this experiment was a kind of eld experiment with little control over the factors that impact
decisions, thus misrevelation could not be quantied.
3Note that in in computer science applications, the class of Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanisms
is widely used, e.g. in resolving task and resource allocation problems that occur in multi-agent
systems (see e.g. Dash, Rogers and Jennings 2003, or Dash, Park and Jennings 2004).
3bad Nash equilibria which are Pareto inferior to the dominant strategy outcome.
Cason et al. (2006) found that the proportion of dominant strategy equilibrium
outcomes increases from 50% for a pivotal mechanism, where implementation is not
secure, to 81% for a securely implementable Groves-Clarke mechanism with single
peaked preferences. As in Kawagoe and Mori (2001), the instructions contained
detailed payo tables. After the disappointing results of Attiyeh et al. (2000),
these ndings shed a much more positive light on the pivotal mechanism.
In this paper, we study the open question of the mechanism's vulnerability with
respect to manipulation by groups. The existence of a simple misrepresentation
of preferences that leads to an increase in payos does not necessarily imply that
strategic manipulation is actually observed: This is the result of an experimental
study on the Borda mechanism by Kube and Puppe (2009). They showed that the
lack of strategy-proofness, which is a well-known aw of this mechanism, does not
have the eect one may expect: Manipulations rates were found to be surprisingly
low even when the voter who had complete information about the other agent's
preferences knew about his superior position. Only when the agent with superior
information was also informed about the other agent's actual vote, manipulation
rates went up signicantly. This suggests that behavior in their context is aected
by uncertainty, while distributional concerns, in particular inequality aversion, do
not seem to play an important role. The authors conclude that the fear of strategic
manipulation is not always justied in an applied framework.
To investigate the eect from the lack of collusion-proofness, we consider a
simple setting in which all agents are informed about others' preferences in order
to facilitate the occurrence of collusion. In addition, we will vary the possibil-
ity to communicate: In one treatment, agents make individual decisions without
communication, and thus only tacit collusion is possible. In the other treatment,
a particular communication network exists, which allows agents to communicate
and co-ordinate their decisions within their subgroup. This setup shall give some
insight into the question whether collusion can occur tacitly, i.e. without explicit
communication, but simply from learning or observing others' behavior over time,
or whether other motives, such as distributional concerns, prevent subjects from
colluding when some subjects would suer signicantly from the collusive outcome.
2 Experimental Design
Consider a group of ve members, who all have given preferences over four dierent
alternatives Alpha (A), Beta (B), Gamma (C), and Delta (D). Each alternative a
represents a non-excludable public good, and agents face the decision whether or
not each public good should be provided. The group consists of two subgroups: the
\majority" of 3 voters, referred to as M-type agents (indexed as m = M1;M2;M3),
4and the \minority" of 2 voters, referred to as N-type agents (indexed as n =
N1;N2. All members within a subgroup have identical (induced) preferences, but
preferences across the two subgroups dier. The true valuation va
i of agent i for
each alternative a is represented in Table 1. All agents have full information about
the valuations of the other agents and the structure of the group.
Table 1: Net valuations for the four alternatives
agent Alpha Beta Gamma Delta
M-type 30 -20 -30 10
N-type 10 40 -20 -40
group 110 20 -130 -50
The outcome is determined as follows: Each agent i submits a report ra
i for
each alternative a, which may or may not correspond to this agent's true valuation
va
i . We shall allow for reported values between -60 and 60 in steps of 10. An
alternative a is selected (the public good is implemented) if and only if the sum
of all reported valuations for a is strictly positive (
P
i ra
i > 0). The number of
selected alternatives is thus endogenously determined. Furthermore, if an agent
is pivotal in the decision, he has to pay the Clarke tax, which corresponds to the
total amount reported by all other agents, i.e. it reects the cost that this agent
imposes on the rest of society by changing the decision. Let ra
 i be the vector of
reports for alternative a omitting the report of agent i. Then the Clarke tax ta
i,
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Each subject in the experiment thus had to submit four reports, one for each
alternative. The simultaneous reports then determined which of the four alterna-
tives would be selected. The total payo of a player is the sum of the payos from
the selected (winner) alternatives minus the respective tax he has to pay. Subjects
were explained on the instruction sheets how payos are calculated. In addition,
we prepared detailed payo tables that include the Clarke tax (see Figures 9-12 in
the Appendix), so that subjects could also read o the tables what their payo for
each possible combination of chosen values would be.4
4From the payo tables one can see that agents are indierent between stating their true
valuation and the next higher valuation for all alternatives, e.g. for M-types, the same payo
is reached for Alpha by reporting 30 or 40, for Beta with -20 and -10, etc. This is simply an
artifact of the discrete space of reports, which implies that each agent has two weakly dominant
5The valuations for each type are chosen such that there should be consensus
regarding the provision of alternatives Alpha (positive valuation for both types)
and Gamma (negative valuation for both types). A major conict of interest be-
tween the two subgroups is expected for alternatives Beta and Delta. Since our
research question regards susceptibility of the pivotal mechanism to collusion, we
used a complete information setup that enhances the occurrence of collusion and
gives simple and precise theoretical predictions. All subjects played 10 rounds of
this game. They were paid out 5 cents for each point earned in the experiment.
Since N-types were likely to make losses, they received a bonus of 15 Euros at the
beginning of the experiment; losses were then subtracted from this bonus. Sub-
jects were not informed at any time about the actual reports of any other subject.
Feedback only included the total sum of reported values for each alternative and
own payos from all four alternatives. We used communication as a control vari-
able to dierentiate between tacit and explicit collusion. In the No Communication
treatment, subjects had no possibility of communication, while in the Communica-
tion treatment we allowed for communication within a subgroup but not between
subgroups. This is sucient in order for subgroups with identical preferences to
coordinate their reports.5 Communication was possible by using a chat program
via computers, which closed after ve minutes. Chatting was anonymous, and any
sort of agreement made via chat is non-binding. The experiment was run on com-
puters using the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Average earnings were 10.30
Euros, and the duration of a session was about 45 minutes. A total of 80 subjects
participated in this experiment at the University of Innsbruck, they were equally
distributed between the two treatments.
3 Predictions
Agents in our game have to submit one report for each of the four alternatives.
The total payo of a player is the sum of the payos resulting from the decisions
on each alternative. As a theoretical benchmark, we assume additively separable
utility functions, and we may thus consider the decision for each alternative sep-
arately.6 The pivotal mechanism is designed such that individual agents have an
incentive to report their true valuation for an alternative. In the absence of col-
lusion possibilities, with a discrete strategy space and a binary decision regarding
the selection of an alternative each agent has two weakly dominant strategies for
strategies in the pivotal mechanism. For the choice of the socially ecient outcome it does not
matter which of these two strategies is selected.
5Agents of dierent type have no incentive to collude by virtue of their opposed preferences
for alternatives Beta and Delta.
6This shall serve as main benchmark. In the section describing the experimental results, we
will also discuss the case where agents bundle the alternatives.
6each alternative: reporting the true valuation or its next-highest level (see footnote
4). Reporting a dominant strategy would then ensure that the social optimum is
achieved. In our experiment this means that only Alpha and Beta should be se-
lected, since only for these two alternatives the sum of the valuations for all group
members is strictly positive.
In games where collusion is benecial for a subset of players, coordination of
individual behavior is crucial to achieve the collusive outcome. The concept of
strong equilibrium by Aumann (1959) requires that such a collusive agreement is
not subject to an improving deviation by any coalition of players. A deviation is
self-enforcing when there are no further protable deviations for a subset of players.
Auman's (1959) strong equilibrium does not require deviations to be self-enforcing,
i.e. an agreement has to be resistent to any deviation which itself is not required to
be resistent to further deviations. This is a strong requirement for non-cooperative
games like ours where pre-play communication is allowed, but agreements on coor-
dinated actions are non-binding. Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) suggested
that such agreements should be self-enforcing. Thus, they require for their notion
of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) that an agreement is a Nash equilib-
rium and immune to improving deviations which are self-enforcing. We will use
this equilibrium notion as a theoretical benchmark for the collusion case.7 As Pe-
leg (1998) showed for a two-person example, the prole of true preferences in the
pivotal mechanism is not a CPNE, as other Nash equilibrium proles exist that
Pareto dominate truth-telling.
As for CPNE in our setup, note that Alpha and Gamma do not impose any
conicts of interest upon the two types, since Alpha oers a positive and Gamma a
negative payo for all. Thus, in a CPNE we must have that Alpha is selected and
no player has to pay the Clarke tax, while Gamma is not selected and no player
pays a tax. If one or more players would have to pay a tax, they would prefer to
revise their report such that they do not need to pay the tax. Such a deviation
would be self-enforcing, as there exist proles of reports for Alpha and Gamma










i g  0. There is a large set of CPNE for Alpha
and Gamma, but the CPNE outcome is unique. Due to the lack of conict, these
two alternatives are less interesting and shall serve mostly as a reference regarding
7Moreno and Wooders (1996) pointed out that in a game with pre-play communication, how-
ever, players may correlate their actions, thus the set of all correlated strategies should be taken
as the space of feasible agreements. They then dene a coalition-proof equilibrium as an agree-
ment for which no coalition (including the grand coalition) has a self-enforcing deviation that
makes all its members better o. We will focus on pure strategies for our experiment, as the
number of pure strategy equilibria is large, and equilibria using mixed or correlated strategies
require even more sophistication by players.
7subjects' understanding of simple decisions compared to the more complex ones
for Beta and Delta.
Regarding the CPNE for alternatives Beta and Delta, note that by coordinating
behavior the majority can ensure that their preferred outcome is implemented.
For Beta, a symmetric strategy for all M-types of reporting  60 (\maximally
underreporting") leads to a CPNE outcome, since, irrespective of the N-types'
reports, Beta is not selected and no M-type pays a tax, thus no coalition of M-
types can improve upon this outcome. A similar reasoning applies to Delta when
the coalition of M-types maximally overreports. However, there are many other
CPNE, which shall be characterized in the following.
(i) In a CPNE Beta must not be selected and Delta must be selected. Suppose
otherwise, i.e. suppose Beta is selected (Delta is not selected). This implies a
payo of  20 (0) for M-types. But the coalition of all M-types can guarantee
a payo of 0 (10) for each M-type by maximally underreporting (maximally
overreporting).
(ii) In a CPNE only coalitions consisting of agents of the same type need to be
considered. To see this, consider a prole of reports that induces a given
outcome regarding Beta. Suppose now that there exists a coalition including
an M-type and an N-type who deviate in order to improve upon this outcome.
If Beta is selected after the deviation, this deviation cannot be self-enforcing,
since the coalition of all M-types can always ensure their preferred outcome in
which Beta is not selected and no M-type pays a tax. If Beta is not selected
after the deviation, then an N-type would only participate in this coalition
if he would have to pay a tax of more than 40 before. This means that the
original outcome must have selected Beta (otherwise the N-type would not
pay a tax). But then it is again sucient to consider only the coalition of
all three M-types who can ensure to avoid the selection of Beta. A similar
argument applies to Delta.
(iii) In a CPNE no N-type pays a tax. Since N-types do not get their preferred
outcome with regard to Beta and Delta in a CPNE, they cannot be pivotal
since that would mean that they submitted a report that goes against their
preferred outcome.
(iv) A CPNE in which all three M-types pay a tax does not exist. Suppose oth-
erwise, then the coalition of all M-types could improve by maximally under-
reporting for Beta and maximally overreporting for Delta, in which case no
M-types pays a tax.
(v) In a CPNE we must have for Beta
P
m rB




100, for m = M1;M2;M3. Recall that in a CPNE Beta must not be imple-
mented. To achieve this, it is sucient for M-types to submit reports such




m   100, at least one N-types would have to pay a
tax of more than 40 and thus prefer not to have Beta implemented. A similar
argument applies to Delta.
In a CPNE, M-types thus submit reports such that either one, or two, or none
of the M-types pays a tax. Furthermore, if two M-types pay a tax, at least one
of them must report -60. Otherwise they could decrease their tax by reporting
-60 and would thus both be strictly better o. This characterization of CPNE for
Beta and Delta helps to identify all CPNE (by computer programming); there are
26195 CPNE for Beta and 25484 CPNE for Delta.
Amongst the large set of CPNE, those with symmetric reports on the boundary
of the strategy space for each M-type, i.e. maximally underreporting for Beta and
maximally overreporting for Delta, seem particularly appealing. These extreme
reports avoid tax payments and ensure the preferred outcome of the coalition of
M-types independent of the reports of N-types. Therefore, they are weakly domi-
nant for the coalition of M-types and should be of particular appeal in an experi-
mental setup. We are interested in observing whether collusion can be established,
and this seems a particularly simple way to achieve such collusive outcome, as it
avoids diculties in coordination. Furthermore, we know from experimental evi-
dence in Charness et al. (2007) that salient group membership induces individual
behavior towards more favorable outcomes for other group members, therefore,
by the design of two subgroups with partly opposed interests, belonging to the
majority would imply that M-types prefer the symmetric extreme reports to any
other CPNE prole where some agent risks to pay a tax. And if our design of
majority versus minority does create a feeling of competition towards the other
subgroup, it would also lead us to expect better coordination, as Bornstein et al.
(2002) have shown in their intergroup competition in a coordination game. While
one may expect that this CPNE with extreme reports for M-types can also occur
in the treatment without communication due to its simplicity and symmetry, it
seems rather unlikely that any other (asymmetric) CPNE strategy prole can be
achieved without explicit communication. Therefore, we take CPNE with sym-
metric reports for the M-types as a benchmark for identication of possible tacit
collusion in the treatment without communication. Since any report of N-types is
a best response to this weakly dominant strategy for the coalition of M-types, we
have 132 = 169 of these equilibria for both Beta and Delta, in which the strategies
of all M-types are identical.
94 Experimental Results
4.1 No Communication Treatment
Outcomes: Selected alternatives. Recall that an alternative a is selected if
the sum of all reports is strictly positive:
P
i ra
i > 0. Table 2 shows the ob-
served frequencies of the various combinations of alternatives over all rounds in
the treatment without communication. First, notice that Alpha, which is the only
alternative that gives both types a positive payo, was always selected. Gamma,
the only alternative that gives both types a negative payo, was selected in less
than 5%, which is in the range of typical errors of subjects in experiments. Re-
garding the two alternatives where preferences are opposite, Delta, the majority's
preferred outcome, was selected in 63%, while Beta, implementing the preferred
outcome of the minority, was selected in 70%. Interestingly, Beta and Delta were
selected simultaneously in a signicant number of games. It is easily seen that
three combinations of outcomes are predominant in this treatment: the social op-
timum fAlpha, Betag occurred in 35%, the best possible collusive outcome for
M-types fAlpha, Deltag in 27:5%, and then we observe the combination fAlpha,
Beta, Deltag in 31% of all outcomes in this treatment. The rst important re-
sults are thus that (i) tacit collusion does not easily emerge when communication
between agents is not possible, despite full information and a seemingly easy-to-
achieve, symmetric collusive outcome, and (ii) the social optimum still plays an
important role. Furthermore, we have a third prominent outcome, fAlpha, Beta,
Deltag, which needs further investigation. It shall be checked whether this was due
to unsuccessful attempts of tacit collusion or whether subjects possibly considered
it a desirable outcome for reasons other than selsh prot maximization.
Table 2: No Communication: Frequencies of Selected Bundles
1 winner 2 winners 3 winners 4 winners
A: 1 (1.25%) AB: 28 (35%) ABC: 1 (1.25%) ABCD: 2(2.5%)
AC: 0 (0.0%) ABD: 25 (31.25%)
AD: 22 (27.5%) ACD:1 (1.25%)
(A=Alpha, B=Beta, C=Gamma, D=Delta)
If the triple fAlpha, Beta, Deltag is regarded as a bundle, this bundle oers
a total payo of 20 for M-types and 10 for N-types. Assuming that there are
subjects with distributional concerns such as a self-centered inequality aversion as
introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and further extended by Charness and
Rabin (2002), these subjects may consider fAlpha, Beta, Deltag as the bundle
oering the least unequal positive payo for the two types of players. In particular,
10this bundle still favors the majority and may thus be more easily supported by M-
types. Compared to this bundle, the collusive outcome fAlpha, Deltag implies a
negative payo of -30 for the minority; the social optimum fAlpha, Betag would
imply positive payos for both types, but they are highly unequal and favor the
minority. The only other possible outcome which implies positive payos to both
types is to select only Alpha, but the payos of 30 to M-types and 10 to N-types
would again emphasize the inequality of payos for the two types of agents. The
bundle fAlpha, Beta, Deltag is implementing payos that are as close as possible
to equal positive payos for all agents. If there are subjects with distributional
preferences, this may well represent their preferred choice.8
Round
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 A AB AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
2 AB AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
3 AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
4 AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
5 AB AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
6 ABD AC AB AB AB AD AD ACD AD AD
7 ABD A AD AD A AD AD AD AD ABD
8 AD AD AD AD A AD AD AD AD AD
Round
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 AB ABD ABD ABD ABD AD ABD AB ABD ABD
2 AD AD AD AD AD ABD AD AD AD AD
3 ABD AD ABD AD AD AD ABD AB A ABD
4 AD ABD ABD ABD ACD ABD AB ABC AD AD
5 AB AB AB AB AB ABD ABD AB AB AB
6 AB ABD AB AB AB ABCD AD AB AB AB
7 AD ABD AD ABD AB AB AD ABD AB AB
8 AD ABD ABD ABCD ABD AB AB AB AB AB
Chat treatment
NoChat treatment
(A=Alpha, B=Beta, C=Gamma, D=Delta)
Figure 1: No Communication: All Outcomes over time
To answer the question whether this choice, which occurred in over 30% of all
outcomes for the treatment without communication, came about as a purposeful
choice or if it happened due to insucient coordination, we rst look at decisions
over time. Figure 1, which displays all selected alternatives for each group and each
period, oers a rst impression of how possible learning of coordinating reports
through repeated interaction aects outcomes. We dene the rst three rounds as
\early" rounds and the last three as \late" rounds in the experiment. Then the
choice of selecting bundle fAlpha, Beta, Deltag occurs signicantly more often in
earlier rounds than in later rounds (two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test (MWU):
p = 0:05), which points towards an unintended outcome, since experience leads
away from selecting this bundle. This would be in line with the ndings of Puppe
and Kube (2009), where no evidence for behavior that could be interpreted as a
preference for inequality aversion was found. Our results below for the treatment
with communication will conrm this result.
8For example, in the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion this would be the
preferred choice of an N-type agent if the parameter , which measures the weight the agent puts
on others' monetary payos when he is behind, is suciently high.
11A comparison of the frequency of selected outcomes over time further conrms
that M-types did not succeed in establishing tacit collusion on fAlpha, Deltag.
There is no signicant dierence in the occurrence of fAlpha, Deltag in early and
late rounds (MWU: p = 0:33), i.e. collusion does not become more prevalent even
though subjects gain experience and learn about other agents' reporting behavior
in their own group. Learning or experience alone was thus not sucient to es-
tablish collusion amongst M-types. The social optimum, on the other hand, gains
importance with subjects' experience. fAlpha, Betag is selected signicantly more
often in later rounds compared to earlier rounds (MWU: p < 0:05). In late rounds,
fAlpha, Betag was selected in 54% of all group decisions, which corresponds to
the implementation of the rst-best outcome through the pivotal mechanism in
other experiments where collusion was not possible (e.g. Cason et al. 2006). This
result might, however, not be due to the pivotal mechanism's incentive to submit
truthful reports (or at least to select a dominant strategy), but rather due to un-
successful attempts of M-types to tacitly collude and the time needed for N-types
to understand how to co-ordinate on the reports of Beta. This shall be further

















Beta: avg. group payoff to type M 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4

















Beta: avg. group payoff to type M  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4



















Beta: avg. group payoff to type N 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4


















Beta: avg. group payoff to type N
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Figure 2: No Communication: Average group payos for Beta by type
Outcomes: Tax payments and Payos. Describing outcomes only in terms
of selected alternatives is not sucient in order to evaluate the performance of the
pivotal mechanism and the occurrence of collusion. Since tax payments may be
considerable, overall payos have to be considered. Furthermore, payos over
time should give information about subjects' possible adjustments after observing
outcomes and payos in previous rounds. For Alpha and Gamma, there were
overall few tax payments (less than 5%). Figures 2 and 3 separately display the
average payos (including taxes) M-types and N-types achieved in each group for
alternatives Beta and Delta over the 10 rounds. Since Beta was selected in over
70%, it is important to understand at which cost for N-types this outcome came
about. Of 160 decisions of N-types, in almost 20% a tax was paid to have Beta
12implemented, and the average tax paid was 28:7. However, these subjects are
signicantly better o despite the tax payment (Sign test: p < 0:01; Wilcoxon
signed rank (WSR): p < 0:01) compared to the case where Beta is not selected.
Similarly, we have 15% of N-types paid an average tax of 23:7 in order to avoid
Delta, and they are better o than if Delta had been selected (WSR: p = 0:07, Sign
test: p = 0:08, one-sided). Thus, while one would normally expect that subjects
learn to avoid tax payments over time since they decrease payos, the feedback
here gives tax-paying N-types a positive reinforcement for both Beta and Delta.
Despite being part of the minority who cannot enforce an outcome with certainty,
past payos encourage N-types to overreport for Beta and underreport for Delta. It
is then not surprising that the frequency of tax payments for Beta does not change
over time. For Delta, N-types pay less tax in later rounds (Pearson 2: p < 0:03),
while Delta is then selected less frequently. This implies that in both cases, the
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Figure 3: No Communication: Average group payos for Delta by type
In 15% of the 240 reports of M-types for Beta a tax was paid in order to avoid
Beta, and it was 22:4 on average. These subjects are no better o than if Beta
had been selected. For Delta, we have 14% of tax-paying M-types to have Delta
selected, with an average tax of 20. These subjects are signicantly worse o than
if it had not been selected (WSR: p < 0:01, Sign test: p < 0:01). Neither for Beta
nor for Delta the frequency of tax payments changes signicantly over the rounds
played. M-types thus do not seem to learn to avoid tax payments, even though
it was never protable for them to pay a tax, and as majority they could have
avoided tax payments all together with a simple coordination on extreme reports.
A closer look at their reports will help understand in which way this result is due
to attempted but insucient coordination of M-types and why N-type were more
successful in achieving their preferred outcomes despite being in the minority.
Behavior: Reports, dominant strategies and collusion. Analyzing sub-


























Alpha Beta Gamma Delta
Figure 4: No Communication: Dominant Strategy Choices
Deltag was not observed in the NoCommunication treatment when it was clearly
a desirable outcome for a selsh M-type, and whether the pivotal mechanism was
successful in eliciting truthful behavior. Figure 4 shows the fraction of dominant
strategies for both types for each alternative.9 For M-types, the fraction of re-
ports that are consistent with a dominant strategy of the non-collusive game is
between one third and one half for all alternatives. Notice, in particular, that the
dominant strategy choices for Beta and Delta, where more strategic reports might
be expected, are not lower than those for Alpha and Gamma. For N-types, the
proportion of dominant strategy reports is overall lower. In fact, we found sig-
nicant dierences between the fraction of dominant strategy reports of the two
types for all alternatives except Gamma (MWU: p < 0:05 for Alpha, p < 0:01 for
Beta, p = 0:60 for Gamma, and p < 0:01 for Delta). For subjects who do not use
dominant strategies, the question is then whether they report strategically instead.
Table 3 shows in which direction subjects deviate from the truthful report.10
Overall, subjects tend to overreport for all alternatives. Even for the alternatives
with negative valuations, they seem hesitant to underreport, and strategic reports
do not seem to play an important role. More specically, all reports for M-types
are above the truthful valuation; this is highly signicant (WSR: p < 0:01) for
all alternatives except Beta. In the case of Beta, strategic reporting would imply
that we observe a signicant number of underreports, which is not the case. And
while 70% of M-types did overreport for Delta, the low number of collusive out-
comes implies that the amount by which they overreported was not sucient. It
also implies that N-types must have behaved strategically. Looking at N-types'
9Recall that the pivotal mechanism provides two weakly dominant strategies for an individual
in this experiment if we consider only non-collusive behavior: reporting the true valuation and
reporting its next-highest value.
10Note that this is dierent from the analysis of dominant strategy choices. Here we refer to
deviations from the truthful report, since we are interested in the direction of the misreport. It
gives a less optimistic picture of the mechanism regarding truthful revelation.
14behavior, we nd, however, that they also overreported (WSR: p < 0:01) for all
alternatives except for Gamma. Strategic behavior would have required overre-
porting for Beta and underreporting for Delta. N-types are thus not overall more
strategic, however, since we observe a signicant number of outcomes where the
minority's preferred alternatives were implemented, those N-types who under- or
overreported must have chosen more extreme values than M-types.
Table 3: No Communication: Truthful Reports and Deviations
M-Types N-Types
Altern. truthful overreport underreport truthful overreport underreport
Alpha .212 .488 .3 .113 .556 .331
Beta .204 .421 .375 .131 .525 .344
Gamma .087 .696 .217 .138 .425 .437
Delta .137 .7 .163 .100 .556 .344





















Alpha Beta Gamma Delta
Figure 5: No Communication: Extreme Reports
Figure 5 displays the proportion of extreme reports, i.e. the proportion of sub-
jects that reported the highest possible value for an alternative with a positive
valuation and the lowest possible value for an alternative with a negative valua-
tion. As we have argued previously, the extreme reports for Beta and Delta shall be
considered a measure for collusive behavior. In the case of M-types, such extreme
reports would imply a favorable and certain outcome of the corresponding alterna-
tive at no tax, while in the case of N-types there is no prole of reports that leads to
a certain outcome. Thus, on the one hand, M-types are in the better position, since
being the majority they can enforce their preferred outcome if they all collude. On
the other hand, it might just be easier to coordinate two N-type reports as opposed
to three M-types when collusion can only occur tacitly.11 Figure 5 shows that the
11In a survey paper on collusion in experiments in the eld of industrial organization, Haan
15proportion of extreme reports diers signicantly between the two types: While
about 28% of M-types maximally overreport for Alpha, where strategic behavior
does not seem necessary (but is also less risky in terms of expected tax payments)
as there is consensus over this alternative, they do not attempt collusion for any
other alternative. N-types, on the other hand, seem to understand immediately
that they can only have Beta selected if they suciently overreport, as we see that
over 40% choose the extreme report here. Interestingly, this strategy is not used
to the same extent for Delta: only about 30% maximally underreport here. Note
that selecting Beta gives a payo of 40, while selecting Delta gives  40, thus while
these two situations are symmetric, successful strategic behavior involves positive
payos for Beta and at best a zero payo for Delta. N-types treat these two sit-
uations dierently. They seem to be less risk-seeking in the loss-context (Delta),
i.e. they do not take as much risk in paying a tax to implement their preferred
outcome when the best possible outcome is merely to avoid a loss, compared to
the gain-context (Beta). This stands in contrast to what would be expected from
Kahnemann and Tversky's (1992) cumulative prospect theory.12
Since coordinating reports might require some rounds of learning, we check
whether the rate of extreme reports changes over time. Table 4 shows that for M-
types there is no signicant dierence in extreme reports for Beta between early
and late rounds; note that the number of M-types who maximally underreport in
NoCommunication is overall very small: only 8% in early rounds and 11% in late
rounds.
Table 4: No Communication: Extreme reports over time
M-types N-types
Altern. early late all early late all
rounds rounds rounds rounds rounds rounds
Beta .083 .111 .092 .375 .479 .425
Delta .097 .111 .095 .250 .354 .281
Allowing for learning is not sucient for M-types to behave strategically de-
spite the complete information context. For N-types, extreme reports are some-
what higher in late rounds, but the dierence is not signicant. Furthermore, the
et al. (2009) pointed out that without communication rms have little success in establishing
collusion, but collusion is found to some extent for industries with only two rms. The possibility
to communicate yielded collusive outcomes.
12In an experiment on social comparison in decision making under risk, Linde and Sonnemans
(2009) also found that decision makers are more risk-averse in the loss context than in the gain
context, however, in their experiment, the gain or loss context was dened by whether one's own
potential payos were above or below a reference person's payos.
16dierence in collusive behavior regarding Beta and Delta persists in later rounds
(MWU: p = 0:05). Overall, there are no signicant learning eects for either type
in the treatment without communication; allowing subjects to gain experience does
not alter their behavior towards more collusion, in particular not that of M-types.
4.2 Communication Treatment
Round
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 A AB AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
2 AB AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
3 AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
4 AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
5 AB AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
6 ABD AC AB AB AB AD AD ACD AD AD
7 ABD A AD AD A AD AD AD AD ABD
8 AD AD AD AD A AD AD AD AD AD
Round
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 AB ABD ABD ABD ABD AD ABD AB ABD ABD
2 AD AD AD AD AD ABD AD AD AD AD
3 ABD AD ABD AD AD AD ABD AB A ABD
4 AD ABD ABD ABD ACD ABD AB ABC AD AD
5 AB AB AB AB AB ABD ABD AB AB AB
6 AB ABD AB AB AB ABCD AD AB AB AB
7 AD ABD AD ABD AB AB AD ABD AB AB
8 AD ABD ABD ABCD ABD AB AB AB AB AB
Chat treatment
NoChat treatment (A=Alpha, B=Beta, C=Gamma, D=Delta)
Figure 6: With Communication: All Outcomes over time
So far we found no evidence for tacit collusion of the majority, despite the simple
and symmetric collusive strategies. When communication among same-type sub-
jects is introduced, results change dramatically, and the pivotal mechanism breaks
down completely. Figure 6 shows that collusion amongst M-types is successfully
established. The occurrence of the majority's payo-maximizing outcome fAlpha,
Deltag increases signicantly from 63% in early rounds to 92% in late rounds (Pear-
son 2: p < 0:02). Behavior is best illustrated by the choice of extreme reports as
shown in Table 5: over one half of all M-types now report  60 for Beta and 60 for
Delta in early rounds, and this proportion signicantly increases to 72% for Beta
and 86% for Delta in late rounds (Pearson 2: p < 0:03 for Beta and p < 0:01 for
Delta). This learning eect implies that it is not only the lack of communication
that prevents M-types to collude, but that probably also cognitive limits constraint
subjects from choosing their collusive best response in this situation. Again, we
observe the particularity that subjects are more hesitant with extreme reports for
an alternative with a negative valuation. N-types, on the other hand, do not use
extreme reports more extensively than in the treatment without communication,
and there is also no change over time for extreme reports of Beta and Delta. This is
easily explained: as the collusive behavior of M-types now determines the outcome,
the reports of N-types become irrelevant. With an increase in collusive behavior,
the rate of dominant strategy choices collapses: while we had about 50% dominant
strategy choices by M-types for Delta in early and late rounds, they decrease from
1723% in early rounds to almost zero in late rounds. Interestingly, introducing com-
munication does not change the proportion of dominant strategy reports for Alpha
and Gamma for N-types (still about 30%), while for M-types they drop from 38%
to 17% for Alpha and from 31% to 17% for Gamma.
Table 5: With Communication: Extreme reports over time
M-types N-types
Altern. early late all early late all
rounds rounds rounds rounds rounds rounds
Beta .556 .722 .642 .479 .500 .544
Delta .528 .861 .733 .479 .458 .456
Comparing the two treatments with regard to tax payments, fewer agents paid
taxes overall in the treatment with communication. This is shown in Figures 7 and
8. Communication thus improved the eciency regarding tax payments: for M-
types in the Communication-treatment, there were signicantly less tax payments
for both Beta (Pearson 2: p = 0:02) and Delta (Pearson 2: p < 0:01). For N-
types, the number of subjects who paid a tax for Beta also decreased signicantly in
the Communication-treatment (Pearson 2: p < :01), only for Delta the decrease
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Figure 7: With Communication: Average group payos for Beta by type
Regarding bundle fAlpha, Beta, Deltag, which was frequently selected in the
treatment without communication, we can nally conclude that it must have oc-
curred unintentionally. It disappeared completely in this treatment where subjects
could have explicitly decided to vote for it. This leads us to the conclusion that
social preferences, which could have inuenced outcomes, have no importance in
this context. One may argue that allowing for communication only among sub-
groups may have emphasized competition between groups and selsh behavior.
18This is possible, and it might be interesting to investigate this eect in further ex-
periments. Our main goal, however, was to understand whether collusion is easily
established in a pivotal mechanism context, and we thus chose a design with two
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Figure 8: With Communication: Average group payos for Delta by type
We gained some additional insight regarding selshness and fairness concerns
by analyzing the chat protocols. Only in 3 out of 8 subgroups of M-types unfairness
towards N-types was mentioned by single subjects. Subjects who brought up the
fairness topic did not insist much and the issue was discarded rather quickly. This
is in line with the ndings of Bosman et al. (2006), who analyzed video taped
discussions preceding group decision making in a power-to-take experiment. In
their context, fairness is also discussed very little and fairness standards are prone
to the self-serving bias. As hypothesized earlier, we can also see from the chat
protocols that not all M-types subjects are able to understand strategic behavior
here. This is why learning is signicant only in the communication treatment, i.e.
only with the explicit help of others can some subjects follow the collusive strategy.
Communication thus helps subjects to understand a complex problem and it helps
coordinate strategies towards a collusive outcome.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the susceptibility of the pivotal mechanism with respect to
manipulation by groups. Knowing that this mechanism is not collusion-proof, it
seems important to understand under which circumstances this property is respon-
sible for the failure of the mechanism in implementing the social optimum. In a
lab experiment where a group decides on the implementation of various alterna-
tives, we investigate the occurrence of tacit and explicit collusion by allowing for
communication in one treatment and prohibiting it in another. While we found
a strong treatment eect, i.e., explicit communication helps to coordinate actions
19such that strategic reports implement the preferred outcome of the majority, there
is little evidence that tacit collusion works in the treatment without communica-
tion, despite the fact that all agents' preferences are common knowledge and there
exists a simple symmetric collusive strategy for the majority. Individual dominant
strategies are chosen by a proportion of one third (Gamma) to almost one half
(Delta) of subjects in the majority, when extreme reports on the boundary of the
strategy space could have ensured the majority's preferred outcome for Beta and
Delta without tax payments. Overall, when communication is absent, the social
optimum is chosen in over 50% of all late rounds.
Learning has no eect on the selection of a collusive outcome for the majority
when explicit communication is not allowed. Only the introduction of commu-
nication has a strong eect on the outcomes: we observe over 60% of collusive
outcomes in early rounds, and gaining experience further enhances collusion, so
that in over 90% of late rounds the majority attains their payo-maximizing out-
come. M-type subjects learn to submit extreme reports which ensure this outcome
at no risk of paying taxes only in the treatment with communication. Outcomes
that would have implemented more equal total payos to all subjects have no im-
portance here. While we chose the communication structure in this experiment
such that it enhances collusion, it may be true that we also created an inter-group
competition between majority and minority, which lead to such little concern for
the payos of the other subgroup. Future work could involve the question whether
the information structure matters, e.g. whether the results would dier if we allow
for communication among all group members, or if subjects can choose with whom
to communicate.
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The pivotal mechanism revisited: Some evidence on group manipulation
Abstract
This paper studies the vulnerability of the pivotal mechanism with respect to ma-
nipulation by groups. In a lab experiment, groups decide on the implementation of
various alternatives, some of which imply opposite interests for the two subgroups.
We investigate the occurrence of tacit and explicit collusion by allowing for com-
munication within subgroups in one treatment and prohibiting it in another. Even
though all agents' preferences are common knowledge and there exists a simple sym-
metric collusive strategy for one subgroup, we nd little evidence for tacit collusion,
not even with increasing experience. Only when explicit communication is allowed,
collusion is established, and it becomes even more pronounced over time.
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